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I. The technocratic mastery of markets 
Financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis have precipitated unexpected reform of the European 
Union. 2014 establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and conclusion of the Treaty 
for Stability, Growth and Co-ordination (TSGC) have significantly deepened the integration basis, 
providing for a measure of solidarity between some, if not all member states. Necessary assistance, 
however, will be delivered to troubled economies within the managerial constraints of a regime of 
economic governance, rather than with the full redistributive blessing of a properly political union. 
The increasingly technocratic nature of the post-crisis regime for European monetary stability has 
attracted the ire of many commentators; in particular, as the strict conditionalities now imposed 
upon national budgetary autonomy within a framework of ‘executive federalism’ (Habermas 2011) 
have usurped traditional national democratic process, where the only available space for protest is 
to be found on the streets rather than parliaments of Athens, Lisbon and Madrid. 
However, it would be all too easy to characterise this integration phase as a knowing period of 
imposition of neo-liberal models of organization upon the continent. Instead, just as sovereign debt 
crisis was a chronicle foretold within an original supranational sin of constitutionalized monetary 
restraint and abdication of political responsibility for establishment of a corollary economic steering 
policy within Economic and Monetary Union (Majone 2014), EU political design is still convoluted by 
lacking national consensus and the absence of a constitutively-redistributive European will. Seen in 
this light, deepened technocratic structures to combat crisis also reflect the default position within 
contemporary socio-economic organisation, or a ‘permissive consensus’ (Crouch 2011), which, post 
political ideology, posits its own universal legitimation within the maximised welfare gain furnished 
by the marriage between governance techniques and the science of new economic liberalisms. 
Permissive consensus – a global trend extending far beyond the EU – has silently overturned the 
post-war, tax-based, redistributive settlement, placing its faith instead in a ‘futurization’ paradigm 
(Esposito 2013 & 2014), wherein the contingent opportunities created within postulated economic 
growth compensate for state welfare withdrawal (Crouch 2011). Within this context, technocratic 
governance is not simply legitimated by recourse to expertise, but is instead lent inspirational 
utilitarian force by pursuit of welfare maximization, and an underlying belief that economic steering 
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capacities – concerned also with securing public goods – can still be exercised by the executive, but 
must now be so in heterarchical rather than in hierarchical forms (Vibert 2011). The sine qua non of 
contemporary governance as it substitutes for representative democracy is its flattened pursuit of 
universal welfare gain within the optimized allocative efficiency of private markets. For peripheral 
Eurozone economies, the doctrine of welfare maximization translates into the futurizing maxim that 
‘following pain will come gain,’ as imposed austerity is geared to structural reform, which, it is 
asserted will eventually unleash the healing powers of privately-initiated economic growth. For 
private markets, however, this self-same precept creates a paradox of executive promotion of a 
competitive market paradigm, which is nevertheless far too important in its social utility to be left to 
be governed by market processes alone. 
The far too often overlooked component within the spread of governance regimes is their dual 
impact, first upon a public sphere of democratic self-expression, but secondly also upon a private 
economic realm. Just as democracy cedes to technocracy, autonomous market exchange is 
overwhelmed by expert imposition of a utility model, which seeks to perfect competition. Nowhere 
is this fact – and the oversimplified nature of contemporary critique of neo-liberalism – more  
apparent than in the case of European response to financial crisis, and, in particular, in the example 
of the corollary to restraint of national sovereign debt: the control of private money creation, or 
accumulation of debt, within European Banking Union. Established by the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM),1 European Banking Union has, as its 
primary function, the combatting of the systemic risk – defined, in this case, as the transmission of 
bad debts within European financial markets – which, as member states were forced to issue 
unlimited banking guarantees, precipitated sovereign debt crisis. Nevertheless, the provision to the 
European Central Bank (ECB) of enhanced supervision powers over the Eurozone banking market 
should also be examined within a far broader context; first of long-standing global revolution in the 
purpose of financial services within all advanced economies, and, secondly, in the recent light of the 
end of the ‘Jackson Hole consensus..[.]..that price stability is sufficient condition for financial 
stability’ (Born et al 2012:186). 
Following hard upon the 2010 creation of the European System for Financial Supervision (ESFS), 
including establishment of the European Banking Authority (EBA) and European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), Banking Union must be viewed against the backdrop of an unprecedented strengthening of 
                                                          
1 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and Regulation (EU) No 
1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the 
conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
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the regulatory and supervisory framework for all European financial services, including insurance, 
banking and credit markets inside and outside the Eurozone.2 Where it completes the dense web of 
executive oversight of private capital maximization within Europe, Banking Union similarly 
apportions the by-now lynchpin role of co-ordination of micro-prudential and macro-prudential 
supervision within European financial markets to the ECB, re-inventing the Bank both as a sectoral 
supervisor for the Eurozone banking market (micro-prudential function), and as a final oversight 
authority for EU financial stability (macro-prudential function). This assumption by the ECB of a dual 
responsibility for monetary and financial stability, is similarly part of a global trend, whereby central 
banks have increasingly been called upon to exercise additional macro-prudential functions (Born et 
al 2012); a trend, which, post crisis, comprises only the final stage in long-standing executive efforts 
to harness, but also to master the competitive benefits of liberalised capital markets. 
Heralded by the ‘Big Bang’ of 1980s deregulation of UK capital markets, global liberalization has 
placed private finance at the very core of the futurization paradigm, wherein capital maximization 
through the multiplication of the usages of money – or of its ‘dual-disposition’ as debt and credit 
(Heffernan 1995:161) – provides both immediate gain and, under efficiently competitive conditions 
of financial innovation, optimized future opportunities for economies and citizens alike. Crisis has 
not ended this dependence upon ‘privatised Keynesianism’ (Crouch 2011), and might even be 
argued to have hardened it, as enhanced supervisory oversight of financial markets now serves a 
dual purpose of promoting competitive utility on the one hand, but also of ensuring, on the other, 
that market dysfunction cannot interrupt futurized provision of public welfare through private 
markets. 
Where the crisis-driven recognition that a revolutionised financial system also poses dangers to 
futurizing growth, such that the primary regulatory aim has become the final perfection of market 
utility by means of control of systemic risk, the ECB now sits at the apex of a system of paradoxically-
permissive interventionism, which, it is postulated, can both maximize capital formation and provide 
financial stability. This Chapter investigates this proposition, detailing first how conflicting goals of 
capital maximization and financial probity are seemingly reconciled within a regime of ‘really-
responsive’ supervision (Baldwin & Black 2010) dedicated to the maintenance of ‘sound European 
money’3 (II). Thereafter, the analysis details the global and EU-specific problems found within 
permissive interventionism, whereby further efforts to square the circle of secure competition 
                                                          
2
 Comprising Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 (ESRB Regulation); Regulation No 1096/2010 (ECB/ESRB 
Regulation); Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 (ESMA); Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (EBA), and Regulation (EU) 
No 1094/2010 (EIOPA). 
3
 Teubner (2011), summarizing recent works of economic theory. 
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within structures of what can be termed ‘democratized technocracy’ (III), create their own hazards, 
once again placing the future of the European Union in doubt (IV). 
II. Squaring the circle with sound money 
ESFS and Banking Union constitute an unparalleled remodelling of EU economic oversight 
competences over private markets. The EBA, together with its sister agencies (ESAs), the European 
Authority for Insurance and Occupational Pensions (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA), is one of the most powerfully-autonomous agencies ever to emerge at EU level, 
wielding unprecedented regulatory competences, as well as previously-unknown intervention 
powers at national level (Moloney 2010). At the same time, and beyond the new scheme of positive 
regulation for EU financial services markets, the ESFS and Banking Union have also created a regime 
for the governance of European money that gives unmatched discretionary powers to expert 
supervisors (Andenas & Chiu 2013). In part, this new governance comprises soft powers, as the ESRB 
Board, chaired by the ECB President,4 pursues a macro-prudential role of preserving overall EU 
financial stability by alerting actors within the ESFS to the existence of systemic risks within markets. 
Eurozone governance, nonetheless also hardens as the ECB exercises micro- and macro-prudential 
oversight powers within the SSM, and the new Single Resolution Agency (SRA) acts under the 
umbrella of Commission competence with regard to the resolution or winding up of bad banks.  
Importantly, however, for all of its innovative features, the crisis-driven emergence of a governance 
regime for EU money cannot be viewed as a European peculiarity, specifically designed to combat 
the spill-over effects that prompted cross-border melt-down. Instead, it is also a part and logical 
continuance of an established global regime of technocratic governance for banking and financial 
services. Created in 1974, the Basel Committee of banking supervisors and central bankers has long 
exercised influence over worldwide banking regulation,5 playing its vital part in structured market 
liberalization, more particularly, in its efforts to define the nature of permissible national ‘prudential 
supervision’ within the ambit of World Trade Organisation (WTO) free trade strategies.6 Where the 
Committee is currently engaged in the urgent endeavour to combat global systemic risk,7 the new 
European regime is part of a wider movement which aims to establish an oversight framework for 
promotion and mastery of global competitive revolution.  
                                                          
4
 And made up of national central bank governors, a Commission representative and the Chairs of the three 
ESAs; see ESRB regulation, note 1 above. 
5
  See, for details: www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm 
6
 General Agreement on the Trade in Services, Annex on Financial Services (2)(a). 
7 
See, the activities of the Financial Stability Board, established in 2009, by the G20 group of nations 
(www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm). 
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1. The risks of revolutionary futurization  
 ‘The movement, management and pricing of risk have moved from the periphery to the core of 
financial activity’ (Borio & Zhun 2012:251): where the same might be said of oversight regimes, the 
commonplace observation that revolutionary change in the global economy was precipitated by 
deregulation of financial services markets must be qualified. Vitally, in the case of banks, the term 
‘deregulation’ is a misnomer, as worldwide release of banking from straitjackets of strict investment 
controls (prudential supervision), as well as from innovation-restraining material supervision 
(product approval), was based, not upon a rejection of regulation, but rather upon its technical 
perfection. That is, upon its rebirth in the risk-based supervision of the capital adequacy and 
governance of banks, as well as, to a lesser degree, in new regulatory frameworks – built upon the 
quality of advice given by financial intermediaries – designed to transform once paternalistic 
conceptions of consumer protection into competitive models of consumer choice.8 In the case of 
financial services, less has paradoxically meant more within a technical regime of permissive 
interventionism, wherein regulation and – far more importantly – enhanced supervisory capacity is 
dedicated to pursuit of market utility.   
New technologies of micro-prudential banking regulation are founded within a core conviction that 
the ever-present leverage risks posed by banks can be managed in a market-friendly manner that 
eschews pre-emptive imposition of regulatory solvency margins for capital adequacy beyond that 
which is necessary to establish basic confidence. Instead, in addition to a minimum capital 
requirement, regulators and regulated work in tandem in order to establish capital adequacy 
margins that reflect the true market position of each organization, or the risks posed by its liabilities 
relative to its assets. In turn, the technique of market-conform, or economic solvency is not simply 
concerned with ensuring that banks are safe (Heffernan 217-266). Rather, where the assessment of 
the soundness of a firm is measured with reference to its real rather than postulated market 
exposure, personalized capital adequacy, tailored to commercial strategy, has a second function of 
promoting a competitive market discipline, within which the strong may be distinguished from the 
weak, and competitive choice is the norm.  
Importantly, however, pursuit of market utility is not limited to banks. Instead, the permissive-
interventionist creed has been pursued across global financial markets, creating new problems and 
prospects for private banks. A post-war sector that lagged far behind the goods market in terms of 
                                                          
8
 This is approach is most advanced within UK regulatory structures and is now similarly complemented by the 
supervisory application of the discipline of behavioural economics, with the specific aim of maximizing 
consumer utility: Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Applying Behavioural Economics at the Financial Conduct 
Authority,’ Occasional Paper No.1, available at:  
www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-1.pdf (accessed March 2014).   
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competitive growth (Heffernan 1996: 123-160) has faced significant challenges to its dominant 
position in the efficient allocation of money. At the same time, however, it has also begun to re-
assert its own profitability within new patterns of heightened futurization opportunity. The core 
facilitating transformation resides in comprehensive change in the nature and role of money within 
the broader economy, and, in particular, in the multiplication of its present and future uses. Where 
banks once paddled quietly in the backwaters of intra-institutional and inter-institutional lending, 
the multiple risks associated with the double-disposition of money, or its simultaneous existence as 
a debt and a credit, were subject to in-house management. The various risks associated with the two 
primary challenges faced by banks – default between creditors and debtors and maturization 
mismatch between monies lent and monies earned – were tackled in a pedestrian manner on the 
basis of superior information about the moral hazard posed by customers, as well as relative 
expertise with regard to the prediction of interest rate and pricing movements. 
Upon Big Bang, the sector faced an existential challenge to its competitive dominance, firstly in the 
mastery of informational asymmetries between creditors and debtors, and thereafter in the 
maximization of capital value for the general economy. Where regulatory liberalization, rapid 
technological advances, globalization and increasing refinement of financial products facilitated 
heightened differentiation of the exogenous and endogenous risks posed to lending operations, it 
created its own myriad and distinct risk pools, thus increasingly substituting the quantitative risk 
modelling of global capital markets for the largely subjective risk assessments undertaken within 
banking firms.9 As global hazards of interest-rate risk, exchange-rate risk and sovereign-default risk 
were separated out from the bank-internal lending dangers of settlement and payment risk, 
operational risk and market and price risk, to be sold within myriad financial instruments, the 
exponential multiplication of the dual-disposition of money, founded in the creation of a new 
contractual market for the management of individuated risks, became its own futurizing reality. 
Innovative financial instruments, such as over-the-counter derivatives, credit-default swaps and 
securities, and legion futures, provided a simultaneous means of packaging out and managing the 
leveraging risks associated with lending, at the same time multiplying the availability of present and 
future monies within capital markets.  
Allowing economies, as well as individual lives to be managed in expectation of constant capital gain, 
futurization nevertheless called into question the profitability of traditional banking models, 
characterised by the strict regulatory divisions made between retail and investment banking, or 
                                                          
9 
For exhaustive details, see Heffernan (1996). Briefly: new financial instruments seek to mimic traditional 
insurance risk pools, bringing together similar risks in order to allow for establishment of an averagely 
affordable price for contractual risk-management (though without reference to actuarial data).  
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between a once distinct public interest in day-to-day financial settlements and more speculative 
investment activities. With the state retreat from widespread welfare provision, the multiplication of 
money usage has perhaps become the drug with which the global economy cannot do without, 
implicating all citizens in immediate gratification, as well as the expectation of financed future 
opportunity. At the same time, however, modern micro-prudential regulation, as well as a still 
powerful post-crisis interest in combined retail and investment banking,10 incentivizes and enables 
the banking sector to play its own important role within capital maximization. The parallel to the 
waning profitability of traditional banking models is equal participation of banks within the 
futurization paradigm, or within the solvency-conform spread of banking sector risks across global 
financial services markets. Where banks are also free to innovate, moving beyond internal risk 
management, in order to securitize and offset lending risks within the highly differentiated products 
of financial innovation, they may now, on the one hand, pose and be exposed to a systemically-
relevant risk of counter-party default, whereby, for example, securitized assets have been revealed 
as worthless vessels of bad debt. At the same time, the sale of individuated risks on global markets, 
offers up a shareholder-value-securing promise of increased competitive efficiency,11 as banking 
liabilities are transferred from balance to trading accounts, becoming assets to be managed in 
contractual operations by individual counterparties with the greatest proven degree of success in 
individuated risk management (Heffernan 1996). 
2. Governing futurization 
In the view of some, ‘recent events’ – financial crisis – ‘show that financial innovation is of limited 
value relative to the risks engendered (Garicano & Lastra 2010:7). The observation captures the 
painful irony of financial crisis. The financial instruments within which bad debt had been dissipated, 
only to re-emerge with disastrous consequences as faith in US mortgage securities collapsed, may 
not simply be dismissed as the unconscionable creations of commission-obsessed bank employees. 
Bad banking practices have quite rightly met with a tsunami of criticism: above all, where the ready 
provision of mortgage facilities to peripheral economic actors within the US was presented as an act 
of economic democratization, or an extension of futurization benefits to the underprivileged, the 
creation of a risk pool of poorer citizens newly incentivized towards indebted behaviour, 
simultaneously created the conditions for the systematic expropriation of the few resources over 
                                                          
10 
See, for the poor prospects of an end to ‘universal’ banking, evidence (Rosa Maria Lastra) to the House of 
Lords Report on the Future or EU Supervision and Regulation (2009), available at: 
www.parliament.uk/business/publications/house-of-lords-publications  
11 
Added-shareholder-value is a new measure of the profitability of banks reflecting the competitive nature of 
revolutionary banking environment. Previously, the health of the sector was assessed relative to its assets-
liabilities balance. See Heffernan (1996:123-160).   
8 
 
which this grouping disposed (Block 2013). At the same time, however, such products not only also 
came into being as advanced risk management tools within financial markets, but were similarly 
largely congruent with the regulatory philosophy developed by a global executive dedicated to 
perfection of innovative competition. 
Much has likewise been written about the role of banking regulation, and in particular, the Basel II 
Accords, in precipitating crisis. Most strikingly, a much celebrated Value-at-Risk methodology (VaR), 
designed to ensure the security of market investments by requiring banks continuously to calculate 
their real-time market exposure has been identified as encouraging the pro-cyclical behaviour of the 
sector, or its over-leveraging on the back of rising markets within which securitized assets were 
subject to overvaluation, such that capital adequacy proved illusionary (Black 2010). At a deeper 
level, however, and writing shortly prior to crisis (Sappideen 2004:61), one commentator unwittingly 
captured the fundamental paradox associated with contemporary banking regulation. Under the 
impetus of futurization, the ‘regulating of risk within the banking sector’ could not and should not 
interfere with the competitive paradigm. Instead, recognition ‘of the vibrancy and necessity of 
financial innovation’ remains uppermost, with the consequence that the success or otherwise of a 
primary micro-prudential goal to, ‘at the same time limit, if not prevent, the downside of bank 
failure’ (Sappideen 2004: 61), resides in adoption by bankers and regulators of a responsively 
interactive supervsors paradigm in which the mutual refinement of risk management takes central 
stage (Black 2007). 
In crisis, the sector was accordingly bolstered in its overdue reliance on market-based securitization 
by its particularly close relationship with supervisors; an intimate partnership that fostered the 
catastrophic joint ‘cognition failure’ that failed to appreciate that individual risk management 
strategies created systemically-relevant risks (Black 2010). Nevertheless, ‘the essential’ – in crisis, 
fatal –  ‘linkage between banks and their supervisory authorities’ (Sappideen 2004:61), or their 
jointly calibrated response to leveraging risks, remains at the core of the Three Pillar supervisory 
structure introduced by Basel II and retained in post-crisis Basel III Accords, as banking supervisors 
continue to engage in a continual process of identification of the exact categories of risk which 
impact upon the multiple usages of money, to then re-engage with the market: first, overseeing the 
advanced economic modelling deployed by the sector to establish their own risk-off-setting capital 
adequacy barriers, albeit subject to higher regulatory capital and liquidity requirements (Pillar One); 
secondly, encouraging the establishment of sector-internal governance structures which are also 
sensitive to newly revealed risk (Pillar Two); and, thirdly demanding adequate disclosure in order to 
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secure market disciplines which ensure the efficiency and innovative character of bank operations 
(Pillar Three).  
3. Systemic risk, macro-prudential oversight and the post-crisis EU 
response 
Futurization is the paradigm that refuses to die; at least to the degree that risk-based supervision 
remains the preferred means to oversee, but also to sustain innovation. The emergence of systemic 
risk within financial markets – for which ‘there is no universally accepted definition, let alone an 
accepted measure of quantification’  (Arnold et al: 2012: 3127) – is a new phenomenon, whose exact 
causes and ramifications are as yet only dimly perceived in economic literature (Siklos 2011; Born et 
al 2012). Nevertheless, where, in the minds of policy-makers, systemic risk equates with financial 
instability ‘so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial system to the point where 
economic growth and welfare suffer materially,’12 ‘waiting was not an option,’ such that ‘policies 
have moved ahead of academic research’ (Arnold et al 2012:3127). Basel III accordingly dedicated 
itself to correcting volatility-inducing Basel II prescriptions, in order to ensure that ‘banks are ‘shock 
absorbers rather than risk transmitters’ in the face of ‘volatile market conditions, or worse still in the 
time of financial crisis,’ (Lee 2013:434 ). However, in seeking also to transform financial markets into 
future guarantors for the global economy, Basel technocrats similarly balanced hardened regulatory 
strictures, in particular in the matter of heightened minimum capital and liquidity requirements, 
against continuing faith in the effectiveness of supervisory oversight of market utility; albeit that the 
relationship between regulator and regulated has now been restructured in order to afford 
overseers greater powers to tailor core market operations to the need for stability. 
Given the role played by the close marriage between the industry and supervisors in crisis, renewed 
Basel faith in an enhanced supervisory role, not only in routine matters of identifying the risks posed 
by the form in which capital is held and debt is dissipated, but also in the technocratic oversight of 
rating agencies, the application of stress tests and the setting of additional countercyclical capital 
buffers and leverage ratios in times of credit growth (Lee 2013: 440-442), may and does appear 
incongruous. Yet, on the one hand, where a new supervisory fulcrum of macro-supervision remains 
as ill-defined as the systemic risk it is designed to combat (below III), the discretionary rather than 
prescriptive character of supervision, just as surely allows for continual corrective adjustment in the 
oversight function (Siklos 2011). Meanwhile, and perhaps far more critically, where ‘the ultimate 
goals of the policy are still the usual macro-economic ones of output and welfare,’ (Arnold et al 
2012:3132) post-crisis oversight schemes remain wholly in obeisance to permissive-interventionism. 
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 Jean-Claude Trichet, then ECB Chair, 2010, 13
th
 Conference of the ECB-CFC Research network; cited by 
Arnold et al (2012:3127). 
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And so too at EU level, where Basel III technical recommendations,13 as well as its creed, are 
reproduced in a dual strategy of hardened regulatory competence on the one hand, and 
establishment of ‘really-responsive’ (Baldwin & Black 2010) governance on the other, wherein 
oversight responds to the systemic risks posed by liberalization by means of soft co-ordination of the 
purposes of micro- and macro-prudential regulation within the ESRB and Banking Union. 
ESFS and the hardening and deepening of EU competence 
The ESFS, established in 2010, was not the first endeavour to co-ordinate financial supervision at 
supranational level, building instead upon the regulatory principles, national networks and European 
standard-setting committees, established in the wake of the report of the Lamfalussy Committee of 
Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets in early 2001.14 A creature of the 
executive-led revolution in global financial services markets, Lamfalussy busied itself with inducing a 
globally-competitive orientation within EU markets. Unwieldy EU regulation and discrepancies in 
national implementation were then viewed as regulatory failings, not because they accentuated 
informational asymmetry, but rather since they retarded adaption of European financial services ‘to 
the pace of global financial market change.’15 By rhetorical contrast, the high-level de Larosière 
group, convened in response to crisis, seemed to return to a traditional concept of market failure: 
where the existing system disposed over an ‘inadequate mix’ of regulatory and supervisory skills and 
had failed to register the ‘the global magnitude of global leveraging,’ its failure to ‘fully understand 
or evaluate the size of the risks,’ must now be corrected by means of strengthened European 
regulation, designed to  entrench improved supervisory management of informational asymmetries 
and to create ‘a co-ordinated early-warning system to identify macro-systemic risks of a contagion of 
correlated horizontal shocks.’16 
Most commentators agree that regulatory arbitrage within the less intrusive Lamfalussy system 
weighed most heavily in favour of the unexpected hardening of the supranational supervisory 
competence (Snowdon & Lovegrove 2010; Andenas & Chui 2013). The preparedness of member 
states to manipulate residual national regulatory competence in order to assert their varying degree 
                                                          
13
 See, for example, The Capital Requirements Directive (CRD III), 2010/76/EU (OJ L329/3 of 12.10.2010), and 
the Solvency Directive for Insurers (Solvency II), 2009/138/EC (OJ L 335/1 of 17.12.2009). The Securities 
Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies (Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009), the Directive on Alternative Investment 
Funds (Directive 2011/61/EU, OJ L174/1, of 01.07.2011), as well as proposed regulation on over the counter 
derivatives and short-selling: COM(2010)484/5 and COM(2011)482. 
14 
Known as the European Financial Services Action Plan (Commission Decisions, 2001/527/EC and 
2001/528/EC (EU Securities Committee and Committee of European Securities Regulators); Commission 
Decision 2004/10/EC (Committee of European Banking Supervisors; Commission Decision 2004/9/EC 
(Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors)).  
15
 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men_en.pdf 
16
 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf 
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of tolerance for the risks posed by financial markets (Andenas & Chui 213) undoubtedly played its 
part in crisis-inducing contagion. Nevertheless, at least to the degree that arbitrage created its own 
particularly obdurate competition barrier, crisis has also provided further opportunities for 
permissively-integrative interventionism within European markets in line with global trends. 
Hardened regulatory prescriptions apart, the ESFS is also a responsive creature of market utility: the 
three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), led by specialist national regulators and shielded 
from political influence, have been inserted into the existing supervisory paradigm, wherein they are 
charged with unavoidably conflicting roles of ‘improving the functioning of the internal market’, 
‘ensuring the integrity, efficiency and orderly functioning’ of markets, combatting ‘regulatory 
arbitrage’ and securing ‘consumer protection’.17 ESAs, with their dual rule-making and supervisory 
function now find themselves on the discretionary front line of simultaneous promotion of 
innovation and security within financial markets. Given the key role of elaborating the new EU 
legislation which implements Basel III,18 ESAs have also accrued unprecedented supervisory powers, 
including, controversially (Moloney 2010), emergency intervention powers in national financial 
instruments markets, where informational asymmetries threaten financial stability (MifiD II19). 
Banking Union and the governance of sound money 
This final focus of the ESFS upon financial instruments is telling: a critical futurization tool, the 
movement of the banking sector beyond its traditional role of mediating informational asymmetry 
to engagement within a contractual market for the management of differentiated risk (Sapideen 
2013), finds its corollary in heightened informational asymmetries and thus also in dangers of the 
spread of poor quality money. This, in turn, creates a new site for prudential supervision in the re-
establishment of control over the multiplication of monies by critical players within markets: an 
operation which demands, on the one hand, that micro-regulatory interventions allowing innovative 
financial instruments to enter the market must also be assessed for their macro-economic impact; 
and, on the other, requires a far broader, liquidity-based assessment of market-based leveraging. 
Revolution within financial services has created its own endemic risks, to which the really-responsive 
paradigm of co-ordinated micro- and macro-prudential regulation is a rejoinder. Nevertheless, the 
technocratic quest for sound money – a concomitant final transformation of the character of the 
overseer from shadowy regulatory presence beyond the firm to tangible presence within it – is 
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 Article 1 of the ESMA, EBA and EIOPA Regulations, see note 2 above. 
18
 In elaboration of framework Directives for European financial services markets. Mirroring old-style 
comitology procedures and in accordance with Article 290 TFEU, the EBA drafts BTS which are given legal force 
as Commission Implementing Acts.   
19
 Directive on markets in financial instruments, Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID 2) repealing Directive 
2004/39/EC and the Regulation on markets in financial instruments (Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 on markets 
in financial instruments). 
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wrapped in uncertainty: on the one hand, in the institutional uncertainties that characterise a still 
evolving technique of macro-supervision; on the other hand, and specifically so in the EU context, in 
the political uncertainties of an as-yet-to-be negotiated relationship between Banking Union and the 
integrated market.    
Like its ESFS counterpart, Banking Union is shaped by its preoccupation with perfected competition. 
The ECB is obliged by Article 3 of the SSM Regulation to pursue ‘economic growth’ in the ‘integrated 
market’; a generalist obligation, which itself translates into a very specific Commission goal: 
Banking Union ‘will put an end to the era of massive bailouts paid for by taxpayers and will 
help restore financial stability. This, in turn, creates the right conditions for the financial sector 
to lend to the real economy, spurring economic recovery and job creations.’20  
Banking Union – and likewise the Single Resolution Mechanism21 – is designed to promote a market-
driven exit from crisis. At the same time, however, it is a leap into the unknown. Co-ordinated 
central bank pursuit of micro- and macro-prudential goals is not a given (see, also, below III): above 
all, in many national settings, 1980s liberalization also found its corollary in re-allocation of banking 
supervision powers away from central bankers to autonomous agencies, not only as a demand for 
specialist oversight grew, but also as the newly apportioned competences of central banks to set 
interest rates were perceived as being in conflict with micro-economic oversight, impacting upon 
sectoral informational asymmetries, and thus, where rates fluctuate, distorting the primary risk 
management process of asset-liability accounting (Heffernan 1996; Claeys & Schoors 200722). At the 
same time, where nascent worries – albeit as yet under-researched – have emerged about the 
distorting realities of a financial circle (Arnold et al 2012), as well as about the impact of risk-based 
innovation models upon existing understandings of the ‘transmission mechanism’, or relationship 
between monetary policy and the general economy (Borio & Zhu 2012), the technocratic 
oversimplifications of Basel III are revealed; the postulation of an ‘equilibrium credit’, or simple 
measure of leveraging to national GDP, which triggers automatic instability-busting pro-cyclical 
buffers,23 is unmasked as a complex formula, reliant for its effective operationalization upon the 
discretional decisional capacities of technocrats. 
                                                          
20 
European Commission Memo (Brussels, 15 April 2014) Banking union: restoring financial stability in the 
Eurozone. Available at:  
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/banking-union/banking-union-memo_en.pdf. 
21
 Which, according to the Commission, will end the ‘serious fragmentation of the Single Market in lending and 
funding’ which ‘impeded efficient lending to the real economy and thus growth,’ ibid n 21. 
22
 For contemporary evidence on the apparent incongruity of macro- and micro-prudential goals (within the 
Russian model).  
23
 See Bunclic & Melecky (2014). 
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In its introduction to Banking Union (COM(2012)511), the Commission underlines its apparent belief 
in the pareto-efficient character of European regulation: ‘Monetary policy tasks [of the ECB] will be 
strictly separated from [its] supervisory tasks to eliminate potential conflicts of interest between the 
objectives of monetary policy and prudential supervision.’ Doubted even by supporters of efficient 
regulation – particularly for money management, which is argued always to possess a redistributive 
dimension (Majone 2004) – the Commission’s technocratic isolationism is immediately undone, 
within the highly discretionary character of ESFS and SSM governance structures. Where the 
necessarily complex nature of the search for sound money – at core a matter of trade-off between 
competitive and prudential goals within financial markets and the economy – is accepted, the 
demand for discretion overwhelms regulatory strictures. Hence, soft governance within the ESRB, 
where the Board has no powers of its own and is instead dependent upon its constituent members 
to combat systemic risk (Ferran & Alexander 2010). Hence, however, also the peculiar structures of 
Banking Union.  
Charged with the direct micro-prudential supervision of ‘significant’ Eurozone banks, defined by 
their size, importance, and volume of cross-border activities (Article 6 SSM Regulation), and required 
to act within a framework of macro-prudentially-oriented oversight, in which it may apply contagion-
busting mechanisms, such as heightened capital adequacy buffers (Article 5 SSM Regulation), the 
ECB is the lead actor in the squaring of the circle between welfare-maximizing efficiency and 
financial stability in the Eurozone. A first indication of inevitable conflict within this function thus 
predictably arises with regard to potential mismatch between the Bank’s monetary and sectoral 
competences: finding their most striking expression in the Chinese walls erected between the ECB’s 
prudential and monetary functions – whereby prudential functions are delegated to personnel who 
are ‘organisationally separated from, and subject to, separate reporting lines from the staff involved 
in carrying out other tasks conferred on the ECB’ (Article 25(2)) – technocratic efforts to divide 
monetary and sectoral policy are simultaneously revealed to be illusory. Separation is not absolute 
but rather co-ordinated by means of a Mediation Panel (Article 25(5) SSM Regulation), which shall 
‘resolve differences of views’ between ‘participating Member States regarding an objection of the 
Governing Council [responsible for monetary policy] to a draft decision by the Supervisory Board 
[responsible for prudential regulation].’ Constituted by a member from each participating Member 
State, chosen from Governing Council and Supervisory Board members, and reaching decisions by 
simple majority, the Panel of – in effect – central bankers would appear to be characterised less by 
strict judicial-type adjudication and more by belief in the rational power of experts to reach 
informed accord in the face of incompatible policy objectives (Joerges & Neyer 1997). 
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This credo of softly ‘deliberative governance’ – and respect for national expertise – is likewise 
reproduced in discretion-extending form throughout the SSM. The Mediation Panel will also 
deliberate in cases where ECB micro-prudential activity appears to conflict with its macro-prudential 
role within the ESRB (Article 25(1) SSM Regulation). Likewise, Article 6(1) SSM Regulation pledges 
that ‘[B]oth the ECB and national competent authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in 
good faith, and an obligation to exchange information;’ a particularly important assurance where the 
ECB is also charged with carrying out supervisory review on national soil (Article 4 SSM Regulation). 
Further, national allegiance to the SSM is secured in the composition of the Supervisory Board, 
responsible for management of SSM tasks, which is made up of representatives of the ECB and 
national central banks (Article 26 SSM). 
This rupture in traditionally strictly-circumscribed powers of executive oversight might be justified by 
the dedication of discretionary governance to the re-establishment of the sovereign competence of 
central banks to create money. Nevertheless, within the broader EU setting, establishment of a 
discretionary Banking Union framework is prescribed by the additional tensions of heightened 
European differentiation, or by potential incompatibility between the interests of member states 
who are and who are not participating within the SSM. The SSM Regulation and amended EBA 
Regulation therefore also create a series of governance safeguards both to protect the co-operative 
nature of EBA-ECB relations and to address the concerns of non-participating member states. The 
EBA retains its remit as sectoral regulator for the whole of the EU, creating an immediate tension 
arises between ECB and EBA functions in the matter of differentiated rule-making for the Eurozone 
and internal market, which is similarly mediated by restatement of the once contested principle that 
the ECB is now subject to Union law (below III), and must exercise its powers to issue regulations 
(Article 132 TFEU) with full respect for EBA competences to draft technical standards, guidelines and 
recommendations to ensure supervisory convergence: ‘ [T]he ECB should not replace the exercise of 
those tasks by the EBA’ (Recital 32 SSM Regulation). More complex, however, is the issue of overlap 
in ECB and EBA supervisory tasks, especially as regard on-going efforts to establish the day-to-day 
methodological mechanics of supervisory oversight where the integrated markets overlaps with 
Banking Union. Here, however, a deliberative relationship is similarly envisaged between the experts 
of each authority by Article 3 of the Regulation which stipulates a ‘co-operative’ partnership. 
Potential strains in ECB-EBA relations due to the difficulties of the co-ordination of the interests of 
participant and non-participant members are given further attention in relation to EBA operation, 
where the fears of non-participant states that their views will fall victim to majority voting in the 
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Supervisory Board have been countered with an amendment to its Founding Regulation.24 Where 
once simple majority voting was the rule, the majority of EBA tasks, such as the preparation of BTS 
will now be subject to qualified majority voting. Only in cases of emergency or breach of EU law will 
voting return to a simple model.25 Within the SSM itself, further safeguards are also envisaged for 
non-members, who may conclude memoranda of co-operation with the ECB, but may subsequently 
object to a draft decision of the SSM Supervisory Board, which is firmly enjoined to act in the 
‘interests of the Union as a whole’ (Recital (72) SSM Regulation), and to ensure the ‘openness and 
transparency’ of the mechanism (Recitals 10 & 14 SSM Regulation). 
IV. Squaring the circle within democratized technocracy 
In optimistic analysis, response to crisis has not challenged the political neutrality of the futurization 
paradigm. Notwithstanding the ‘novelty’ of macro-prudential regulation (Geva 2013:408), 
discretionary squaring of the circle of sound money remains a wholly technocratic exercise as 
potential conflict between sectoral and general economic policy dissolves within the simplicity of 
really-responsive regulation, wherein ‘[m]acro-prudential regulation’, concerned with ‘interactions 
between financial institutions, markets, infrastructure and the wider economy [.] complements the 
micro-prudential focus on the risk position of individual institutions, which largely takes the rest of 
the financial system as a given;’ albeit that ‘neither type of policy is a substitute for’ sound private 
sector risk management, which should ‘internalise the risk of potential losses’ (Joosen 2010:49826). 
Optimism extends even to the balancing of monetary and prudential supervision at whichever level 
it might arise. Where micro-supervision concerns itself with ‘endogenous risks’ to stability, posed by 
the ‘collective behaviour of financial institutions,’ where ‘financial crises are not an act of God,’ but 
the outcome of ‘systemic distortions in perceptions of risk and responses to it’ (Geva 2013:409), and 
where macro-supervision tackles risks ‘exogenous’ to the sector, in particular, temporal pro-cyclical 
biases27 - themselves closely related to overall liquidity levels dictated by monetary policy – pursuit 
of financial stability through alignment of endogenous to exogenous risks places macro-
interventionism in a ‘land between monetary policy and supervision’ (Geva 2013:41028). However, as 
no lesser body than the Bank of International Settlement has argued, the lynchpin role that is now to 
be played by central banks in addressing ‘the close two-way relationship between .[.]. pro-cycliality 
                                                          
24 
See note 2 above.  
25 
Including simple majorities of participating and non-participating members, Article 41, paragraphs 2,3 & 4 
Amended EBA Regulation, see note 1 above. 
26
 Citing the Co-ordinating Committee on the Global Financial System of the Bank of International Settlements. 
27
 Note that systemic hazard may also be situational, whereby risks are concentrated upon one area of the 
market (Geva 2013:409). 
28
 Citing Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. 
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and conducting monetary policy’ is similarly legitimated by technical expertise, or their ‘deep 
experience in system-wide analysis and intervention.’ 
Others are far less sanguine: 
[A] central bank is not an appropriate institution for macro-prudential supervision because 
central bankers are not legitimate politically to make decisions that involve important trade-
offs between political and economic objectives [.] [S]uch decisions should be left with finance 
ministries and other elected officials (Ferran & Alexander 2010:771). 
This lesser faith in the technocratic legitimacy of central bank steering capacity reflects the view that 
the pursuit of sound money is far less a value-neutral squaring of the circle between innovation and 
stability, and far more an abdication of political responsibility for the consequence-laden decision to 
curb or to facilitate futurization. As the historical arbitrage which bedevilled the Lamfalussy system 
amply demonstrates, variations in risk appetites do exist, in this particular case between member 
state governments, and are just as much demonstrative expression of the political nature of trade-
off between lost opportunity gains and immediate, if utility-dampening security, as of a desire to 
protect national markets. 
Within economic literature, growing sensitivity towards the political complexities of the pursuit of 
sound money is reflected in studies, which, at their most optimistic, highlight the ‘reputational risks’ 
(Born et al 2012:180) posed to central banks by assumption of macro-prudential functions; likewise 
fearing, at their pessimistic worst, that politicisation of the central bank function may eventually 
overwhelm technocratic independence: ‘[o]ne can reasonably ask whether, having won the battle to 
maintain central bank independence, some central banks may in the future lose the war, if and when 
the next crisis emerges’ (Siklos 2014:7). Within the specific context of the EU, growing political 
complexity is also apparent within the endeavour, however indistinct, to democratize exercise of 
technocratic discretion within Banking Union. 
1. Democratized administration 
Three decades ago, Claus Offe was drawn to note that: ‘[b]ehind the façade of parliamentary 
democracy, both political conflict and the resolution of policy issues increasingly takes place within 
organisations which are unknown to democratic theory’ (1980:8). Little has changed since, especially 
as regards a growing technocratic preference. However, practice is nonetheless argued to have 
outpaced theory, at least to the degree that recent, empirically-founded studies, although conceding 
the loss of ideological battles between command interventionism and market-conform supervision, 
maintain that typological distinctions made between ‘autonomous’ regulatory models do matter to 
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the degree they reflect continuing dispute about the end to which steering capacities are to be 
exercised within the modern economy (Vibert 2011). In this view, autonomous governance is not 
synonymous with depoliticization, but is rather the establishment of a ‘regulatory enterprise’ 
(Prosser 2010) within which sharp divides between efficiency-led regulation and continuing pursuit 
of public goods have dissolved within a praxis of discretionary supervision in which all competing 
rationales are still fought out (Prosser 2010).  
This role for national parliaments is appropriate given the potential impact that supervisory 
measures may have on public finances, credit institutions, their customers and employees, 
and the markets in the participating Member States (Recital 56, SSM Regulation). 
Explaining enhanced lines of reporting within Banking Union to the Council, to the European 
Parliament and, strikingly so, to national parliaments (Article 21 & 22 SSM Regulation), the SSM 
Regulation immediately concedes the distributive – if not re-distributive – character of Banking 
Union at national level, as well as the potential for its negative impact upon the daily lives of 
individual Europeans. For all that the ECB is enjoined to act independently from any political 
influence (Article 19 SSM), a partial politicization of Banking Union is the inevitable consequence of a 
further diminution of national financial control, and similarly plays a role within ESFS; or does so to 
the degree that ESA founding regulations, not only provide for parliamentary oversight, but also 
accord with the new lines of delegation within the EU established by the Lisbon Treaty (Article 290), 
such that Commission implementing powers are subject to sunset clauses and Council and 
Parliament recall powers. 
Giving credence to studies which stress an empirical fact of the politicisation of modern technocratic 
governance, for example in enhanced congressional supervision over Basel technocrats (Barr & 
Millar 2006), SSM and ESFS politicization nonetheless does not equate with their democratization. 
Instead, continuing Janus-like tension between technocratic and politicized elements in the 
governance of sound European money also reflects more deep-seated disjunctions within 
contemporary perceptions of the appropriate relationship of executive governance to democratic 
process. At one end of the spectrum, total insulation of expert decision-making from conventional 
political process is itself argued to be a democratic expression of a will to isolate long-term 
objectives from political contingency (Majone 1994). However, lying between this position and 
assertion of direct political oversight, a continuing democratic impulse may also be identified within 
efforts to secure the transparency, accountability and deliberative quality of EU executive structures 
and within their subordination to the rule of law. Deriving, not from models of representative 
legitimation, but rather from more deliberative, participatory and pluralistic theories, the 
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democratization of EU technocratic structures nonetheless remains experimental, and therefore 
fractured, creating – in a final sting of the tail – its own hazards. 
2. Deliberative dissonance and a fractured rule of law 
Key to the deliberation-fostering transparency and accountability of EU permissive-interventionism 
is the ability of the Council, European and national parliaments to interrogate the innovation-
stability securing fulcrum of ECB macro-micro supervision. However, where augmented 
parliamentary oversight now also entails national level review in order to ensure the 
‘proportionality’ and ‘subsidiarity’ of ECB operation (Recital 56 SSM), history teaches us only that 
confusion about its exact purposes can result in weaker rather than enhanced supervision of 
discretionary executive powers. The illustrative example is that of long-standing European 
Parliament review of ECB monetary policy: urging caution about the results of their quantitative 
study of Bank-Parliament dialogue, Amtenbrink & Van Duin (2009) are nonetheless sufficiently 
confident to highlight the problems arising where parliamentary scrutiny of ECB operation is 
muddled; in this case, by the question of whether review seeks to assess the quality of ECB 
monetary performance, or whether, by contrast, it is more concerned with the Bank’s role in 
formulation of EU economic policy. Historically, and despite close co-operation,29  parliamentary 
preoccupation with a ‘secondary’ ECB task to support EU economic policy (Article 127(1) TFEU) has 
equally distracted it from review of the technical quality of ECB monetary policy, in a trend which 
does not ‘necessarily point towards an effective scrutiny by the EP of the ECB.’ 
The core problem has been one of the ECB’s continuing attachment to an oversight model which is 
directed to a review of its monetary competence rather than to its democratic responsiveness: 
‘[T]here is only one criterion on which the ECB [.] will be and should be judged, and that is whether it 
delivers what it is instituted for, namely price stability.’30 By the same token, the European 
Parliament has conceded this technocratic argument, at least to the degree that the ‘falling number 
of inquiries in this regard either suggests that over time the ECB has worn out MEPs in their efforts 
to have the ECB place more emphasis on its secondary objective, or that MEPs increasingly trust the 
ECB to make the right assessments and to take the right decisions’ (Amtenbrink & van Duin 2009: 
567-568). 
Where deliberative dissonance, or cognitive mismatch about the purposes of transparency and 
reporting requirements are reproduced throughout the sound money regime – for example, where 
                                                          
29
 The ECB Chair also appears before specialist committees; a practice developed in addition to a formal annual 
reporting requirement. 
30
 Monetary dialogue of November 9, 1999. Cited in, F.Amtenbrink & K.Van Duin (2009). 
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the European Parliament reviews ESA work-programmes31 - European and national parliamentary 
oversight will neither contribute to consensual establishment of an agreed degree of European risk 
tolerance, nor will it provide effective supervision of the balance struck between security and 
innovation: the worst of all possible worlds.  At the same time, however, potential for deliberative 
failure within the system is matched and perhaps surpassed by renewed instability within the EU 
rule of law. 
The SSM Regulation is surprisingly detailed in its assessment of the dispute on the degree to which 
the ECB, whose independence from political influence is explicitly guaranteed by Article 130 TFEU, is 
subject to general provisions of European law: ‘[T]he ECB should carry out its tasks subject to and in 
compliance with relevant Union law including the whole of primary and secondary Union law, 
Commission decisions in the area of State aid, competition rules and merger control and the single 
rulebook applying to all Member States’ (Recital 32 SSM Regulation). Drafting caution, however, is 
perhaps justified in view of the language used by the then European Court of Justice (ECJ), when 
subjecting the ECB to Union law in the 2000 case of OLAF.32 Where AG Jacobs accurately précises the 
judgment, a degree of legal uncertainty must still arise, at least as regards the Bank’s duty to respect 
any Union law that negatively constrains its primary commitment to price stability: 
[T]he Treaty and the Statute confer upon the ECB a high level of independence [.] However, 
the principle of independence does not imply a total isolation from, or a complete absence of 
co-operation with, the institutions and bodies of the Community. The Treaty prohibits only 
influence which is liable to undermine the ability of the ECB to carry out its tasks effectively 
with a view to price stability, and which must therefore be regarded as undue.33 
To the degree that the ECB remains attached to its privileged position within the Union as a 
‘Community within a Community’ (Zilioli & Selmayer 1999:284), and the close two-way relationship 
between pro-cycliality and monetary policy is accepted, the double-negative within the AG’s 
grammar creates its own potential for legal fragmentation. Must the bank respect Commission 
Implementing Acts for ESA action, which it considers to encroach upon its monetary competences? 
Can the ECB release its own corrective regulations, at least within the Eurozone? 
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 See note 2 above. 
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 C-11/00, Case C-11/00, Commission of the European Communities v European Central Bank. Establishing its 
own anti-fraud measures and thus failing to recognise Regulation 1073/1999 establishing the Community anti-
fraud body, the ECB asserted a very wide measure of autonomy for itself in relation to the application of 
Community law, justifying this position with reference to the failure of the TFEU to recognise the ECB as an EU 
institution, its own legal personality, the independence afforded to the institution (108 TEC), its independent 
competence to make regulations and take decisions and TFEU failure to subject ECB accounts to review by the 
Court of Auditors.,  
33 
Case C-11/00, note 33, AG Jacobs, paragraph 60. 
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The potential for a fractured European rule of law may appear remote. However, institutional 
uncertainty is not confined to Banking Union, but has already emerged within the ESFS, where the 
legal challenge made by the UK Government to emergency intervention powers afforded the ESMA 
under MifiD directives was far less surprising than its outcome, in which the CJEU belatedly 
confirmed direct delegation of EU competence to ESMA and, by association, to each of the three 
ESAs. At ESFS creation, the long-standing Meroni doctrine of the Court34 was thought to preclude full 
independence of agencies at EU level, which were instead seen as semi-autonomous, independent in 
fact rather than law, operating under formal Commission competences. The source of the doctrine 
was the principle of the balance of powers, which the ECJ construed as meaning that executive 
powers might only be delegated to institutions recognised by European Treaties. As creatures of ad 
hoc regulatory necessity, agencies had no named place within EU institutional architecture and no 
formal autonomy. By the same token, the Commission’s relations with its own agencies have often 
been strained to the degree that de facto autonomous agency operations threaten to alienate the 
competences of a Commission held legally accountable for them. 
Institutional uncertainty has accordingly been italicised rather than overcome by the ESMA 
Judgment, particularly with respect to the Commission’s politically-straightened position since the 
Lisbon Treaty, and consequent potential for mismatch between Commission Implementing Acts and 
ESA BTS, as well as, ESA emergency actions. Whereas the TFEU now subjects delegation to the 
Commission of an implementing competence for financial services to temporal constraint and 
standing recall powers, the sword of Damocles hovers over Brussels heads; meanwhile ESAs with 
their distanced seats in Frankfurt, London and Paris and now also operating under the direct 
protection of the Meroni doctrine have assumed their own autonomous competence to intervene 
directly into national markets.  
For the European Commission, ESMA creates a danger that it will be cast as a perpetual loser in an 
institutional game of competence accrual. By the same token, however, crisis-driven fragmentation 
of the European executive competence, or the dismantling of the lines of Union delegation that 
were so recently crafted by the Lisbon Treaty – also by new ECB powers to legislate directly for the 
Eurozone banking sector (Article 4(2) SSM Regulation) – not only undermines the effort to 
democratize financial governance from the outset, but also creates important concerns within 
financial markets that rancour around financial oversight institutions, including a clash of interests 
between participating and non-participating SSM states, may stoke inefficiency within them. One 
possible safeguard for markets might be the subordination of the SSM and ESFS to the European 
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Case (9/56) Meroni v High Authority [1957-58] ECR 133. 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular, to rights of due process and freedom to conduct a 
business (Recitals 63 & 86 SSM Regulation). Assertion of fundamental business rights within the EU, 
however, remains in its infancy and must likewise be balanced against distorting assertion of political 
and social rights (Mabett 2011). 
IV. Uncertainty, or render unto the market… 
Mismatch between regulatory goals and the profit motive is a constant phenomenon: 
The role of a central bank [.] is to minimise the possibility of financial collapse in a system, 
because the social costs of bank risk-taking exceed the private costs. Private banks, on the 
other hand, have the objective of maximising profits and shareholder-added-value by taking 
risks. There is no reason why bank management should be concerned with the social costs of 
bank failure. Furthermore, if managers demanded that the riskiness of every new product be 
properly measured from the outset, financial innovation would be non-existent, and the 
profitability of banks undermined (Heffernan 1996:221-222). 
The strict controls applying to traditional banking services just as surely curtailed profit-
maximization. Yet, when compared with earlier models, paternalistic in their care for banking 
consumers, and sometimes greedy in their harnessing of sectoral resources to the purposes of 
command interventionism, the modern shotgun wedding of the sector to supervisory structures of 
permissive-interventionism creates its own curious but far-reaching patterns of abuse. Where once 
prudential regulation was justified by a socio-economic interest in maintenance of effective day-to-
day financial settlements, or by a demand that funds be invested in state bonds or favoured 
domestic industries for the benefits of the (socialised) nation, it simultaneously established its own 
politically-curtailed market superstructure within which profit might then be freely pursued. By 
contrast, contemporary supervision, founded in a vaulting ambition to establish universal welfare 
gain, reaches deeply into the very psyche of the sector. A national example proves instructive:35 
That firms should be allowed to fail so long as failure is orderly [.] reflects the view that firms 
should be allowed to fail, and thereby subject to the disciplines of the market. It is important 
for firms to be able to fail in an orderly way without public funds being put at risk since, apart 
from being an unwarranted subsidy, the public provision of solvency support to a firm [.] can 
create an expectation of future assistance. This ‘moral hazard’ in turn increases the risk of 
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The Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to Banking Supervision (Bank of England June 2014) 
available at: www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/other/pra/supervisoryapproach.aspx (accessed 
September 2014), paragraph 21. 
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future financial instability, as it provides incentives for excessive risk-taking and reduces 
market discipline. 
Explaining its approach to bank failure, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), the division of the 
Bank of England responsible for UK oversight within the ESFS, simultaneously enunciates the 
dominant philosophy of contemporary banking supervision. The PRA demands that banks have a 
profit-driven risk appetite and expose themselves to failure within a market discipline that 
simultaneously secures the futurization paradigm. However, ‘this risk appetite should similarly be 
consistent with PRA’s objective’s’ of ‘safety and soundness’ and the ‘continued stability of the 
financial system.’36 Any other form of risk appetite – profit motive – is a sinful excess, preferably to 
be exorcised within the creed of supervisory oversight of bank-internal risk-management, at worst, 
to be atoned for within a supervised market exit. 
We live in a technical age which has made an orchestrated homo economicus of the banking sector: 
the quantitative modelling of markets for differentiated objects of risk management has largely 
superseded human judgments made within the firm. Subject also to the desire that they should 
internalise the risk of potential losses, banks are only further denatured by permissive-
interventionism, as their risk appetites are simultaneously crafted to the prerogatives of financial 
stability within economic growth. That security in growth is an illusion, matters not a jot. The UK 
example is again revealing: ‘[w]hile quantitative models can play an important role in supporting 
firms’ risk management, the PRA expects firms to be prudent in their use of such models given the 
inherent difficulties with risk measurement.’37 
The post-crisis recognition that risk analysis is not always an objectively-quantitative exercise, but 
may be skewed at the outset by subjective assumptions – a pertinent example being that a rising 
market will continue to rise – and, above all, the amplified awareness that some dangers cannot be 
foreseen,38 are perhaps only restatements of the seminal distinction long ago made by Frank Knight 
between risks and uncertainty (1921). That is, between dangers which can be calculated in 
probabilistic paradigms (risks), and hazards which defy all statistical accounting (uncertainty). Yet, 
within the permissive-interventionist paradigm, the radical nature of this statement is obscured, 
subsumed within a science of manageable risk, wherein the full extent of Knight’s careful revelation 
of the profit motive as an unknowable creature of uncertainty, is discounted, reduced to a systemic 
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A realization general to the social sciences, which pre-dates the financial crisis, above all, where dangers 
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distortion in the perception of risk. By the same token, the post-crisis reiteration of the dominant 
futurization paradigm, reacts, first, with enhancement of the supervisory function, which reaches its 
zenith in the elevation of central bankers to a messianic station; and, secondly, through its 
experimental politicization of the regulatory-governance complex for sound money, thus offering up 
what is still only a fig leaf of democratic legitimation for the welfare losses that necessarily 
accompany any trade-off between competitive innovation and financial stability. 
The European Union is not alone in the extent of its denial of a Hayekian truth of a market of 
spontaneously unmanageable human exchange relations. Instead, mainstream political debate in 
the age of futurization has been remarkable only for its silence about the consequences of the 
amplified socio-economic expectations that have been levelled at private financial markets following 
state welfare withdrawal: above all, the inevitability of individual loss due to market failure, but also 
the difficulties facing the denuded state in the matter of the co-ordination of competing welfare 
claims. To render unto markets the truth of the uncertainty that is theirs, would appear to be too 
unpalatable a political utterance. However, within Europe, the attractions of political abdication are 
only magnified by the material allure of the science of new economic liberalisms, or their promise of 
value-neutrality in the positing of universal welfare gain within market disciplines, deemed –
counterfactually – to be a given force of nature. 
Brother, ‘can you spare a paradigm?’ (Hall 2014):39 European potential for recovery from a 
ubiquitous futurization drug is necessarily limited, not simply by its ambition to maintain step with 
the pace of global financial market change, but also by the difficulties of withdrawal from a narcotic 
that deadens conflict about the purposes of Union and incommensurability between the interests of 
its member states. The ESFS and SSM are corollary to the ESM and TSCG, not simply in their 
preoccupation with a market-driven exit from crisis, but also in their value-neutral foreclosure of a 
Union-destabilizing space of political alternatives. Nevertheless, just as European peculiarities drive 
inevitable adoption of the futurization paradigm within a discretionary governance regime for sound 
European money, they simultaneously heighten insecurity within it. In the short years since ESFS 
establishment, much has been written about its capacity to amplify uncertainty within European 
markets, especially as regards the difficulties of co-ordination between binding European standards 
and their context-dependent national application (Black 2010; Moloney 2011a; Moloney 2011b): 
how many more hazards will be created by increasing differentiation between the Eurozone and the 
integrated market? How many new uncertainties will be created by future deliberation failures or 
challenge to the rule of Union law? 
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European hubris, belief in the ability of governance steering capacities to reconcile the competing 
welfare claims of markets, national governments and individual citizens, just as surely finds its 
apogee in the multiple demands now being made of the ECB. In line with global trends, the bank has, 
in short measure, been laden with monetary oversight, micro-supervisory functions and the core 
macro-economic role of balancing competition against stability; albeit that it is still not a lender of 
last resort. Stated this baldly, the greater surprise is not the extent of political abdication of 
responsibility for public welfare, but the current reach of miraculous faith in the capacity of any 
technocratic body – let alone such a relatively youthful organisation, armed only with the 
legitimation of expert deliberation – successfully to assume this discarded political function. 
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